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Abstract 
This paper analyzes debt-equity choice for financing a two-stage investment when a firm’s insiders 
have private information about the firm’s expected earnings. When private information is one-
dimensional (for example when short-term earnings are common knowledge while long-term earnings 
are private information) a separating equilibrium does not exist. When private information is two-
dimensional a separating equilibrium may exist where firms with a higher rate of earnings growth issue 
debt and firms with a low rate of earnings growth issue equity. This provides new insights into the issue 
of different kinds of securities by different types of firms under asymmetric information as well as the 
link between debt-equity choice and operating performance.   
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1. Introduction 
      This paper analyzes debt-equity choice when asymmetric information exists between firms’ insiders 
and market participants regarding future earnings. Most existing literature deals with one-dimensional 
asymmetric information-most frequently concerning the value of the firm. In this approach the solution 
is typically a pooling equilibrium where the "bad" type (one with low value) mimics the "good" type 
(one with high value) by issuing the same kind of securities. A "second effort" (additional assumptions) 
is needed to explain why firms issue securities that are not a part of the equilibrium.  
       In the present paper, we analyze a signaling game where private information is two-dimensional: 
the insiders have private information about the amounts and timing of future earnings.1 Asymmetric 
information about the timing of earnings may take place because: 1) managers may have private 
information about the choice of inventory and depreciation methods, allowance for bad debts, 
expensing of research and development, recognition of sales not yet shipped, estimation of pension 
liabilities, capitalization of leases and marketing expenses, delay in maintenance expenditures and delay 
in production; 2) managers may be subject to moral hazard problems which affect the intensity and 
productivity of their efforts over time and; 3) corporations typically employ long-term strategic 
planning, giving insiders private information for several years. Financial literature dealing with the 
importance of earnings timing usually focuses on its impact on firm’s value. The typical conclusion is 
that, all other factors being equal, short-term earnings lead to a higher firm value than long-term 
earnings ("faster is better"). In the present paper we focus on the link between the timing of earnings 
and the capital structure choice.  
      We analyze a two-stage investment-financing model where managers representing initial 
shareholders have the choice between debt (short- and long-term) and equity. When only the total 
                                                 
1In a similar spirit, some scholars assume that insiders have private information about the riskiness of their cash flows. See, 
for example, the second part of Brennan and Kraus (1987), Brick, Frierman and Kim (1998), Grinblatt and Hwang (1989) 
and Giammarino and Neave (1982). 
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earnings are private information, and the timing of earnings is common knowledge, the equilibrium is 
pooling. However, when both the value of the firm and the timing of earnings is management’s private 
information a separating equilibrium may exist. The following explains the main ideas behind the 
separating equilibrium. First, it is well known that in a separating equilibrium each financing strategy is 
chosen by the worst possible type of firm for that strategy (from the investor’s viewpoint).2 Otherwise 
the firm will be mimicked by other firms which will benefit from the overvaluation of issued securities. 
We show that the value of shares depends on the firm’s total value and not on the timing of earnings or 
on the rate of earnings growth; the value of long-term debt relies on the expected performance in the 
long term and the value of short-term debt depends primarily on the expected performance in the short 
term. If a firm with a high rate of earnings growth issues long-term debt it will be mimicked because of 
high expected long-term performance which implies a high value of long-term debt respectively. The 
same holds if the firm issues equity. Other firms may find it attractive to mimic this strategy not 
necessarily because of the high value of equity but because of the high value of future claims which the 
firm will issue in the long term. Thus, if the firm with a high rate of earnings growth and low short-term 
earnings respectively tries to separate itself in equilibrium it would do better to issue claims with the 
value depending primarily on short-term expected performance (short-term debt).  
       The main engine driving the results of the paper is that a separating equilibrium exists where firms 
with a low rate of earnings growth issue equity. This equilibrium implies that firms issuing equity have 
better operating performance at the moment of issue or in the near future after issue, and that these 
firms have lower operating performance in the long run. The long run operating underperformance of 
equity issuing firms has been documented in several studies. This phenomenon is characterized by 
Ritter and Welch (2002) as the most controversial area of IPO (initial public offering) research. 
Whereas only a few studies support the efficient market point of view, others argue in favor of a 
                                                 
2Brennan and Kraus (1987). 
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behavioral point of view.3 In contrast to the well-documented observation that firms issuing equity have 
higher performance just before the issue, their higher absolute performance immediately after issue has 
not been a major point of empirical and theoretical research, though it seems to be consistent with some 
empirical evidence.4 According to Jain and Kini (1994, Figure 1) the operating return on assets is higher 
for IPO firms in the first years after the issue and the operating cash flow on assets is higher in year “0” 
(immediately after issue). In Loughran and Ritter (1997) profit margins are higher in years 0 and +1, 
although there is different evidence about operating returns. In Mikkelson, Partch and Shah (1997, 
Table 3) IPO firms have higher performance in year 0.  
      The model also generates new predictions which have not been tested in existing literature. In 
particular, we study how the following factors affect the conditions of existence for a separating 
equilibrium: bankruptcy costs (reorganization costs), the extent of asymmetric information regarding 
firms’ values and the timing of earnings. For example, we argue that the emergence of separating 
equilibrium and phenomena such as long-term underperformance of firms issuing equity are more 
probable when the extent of asymmetric information regarding the timing of earnings is relatively large 
and that regarding total earnings is relatively low. When the difference between firms’ total values is 
large enough a separating equilibrium does not exist because the type with a low total value will mimic 
the high value type. On the other hand, a large difference in the firms’ rates of earnings growth 
contributes to the existence of equilibrium by making it possible for a firm to design debt claims which 
will not be mimicked by other firms. We provide a discussion of possible strategies for testing this 
result.  
       The model in the present paper is closely related to the “pecking-order theory” put forward by 
Myers and Majluf (1984).5 They consider a single-stage investment model in which asymmetric 
                                                 
3When speaking about long run performance, Ritter and Welch (2002) incorporate all aspects of this problem and not 
specifically the afterissuing underperformance of firms that issue equity, although this aspect is a part of their analysis. 
4Most analysts conclude that issuing firms underperform non-issuing firms in the first few years after issue. The 
undeperformance is measured by the performance after issue relative to the performance in the year before the issue. This 
does not contradict the fact that these firms my have higher absolute performance immediately after issue. 
5Our model is also related to Goswami, Noe and Rebello (1995) where a firm’s managers have long term private information 
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information exists about the value of both assets in place and the new project.6 While it provides many 
important insights into firm behavior under asymmetric information, most notably the underinvestment 
problem and why firms may prefer internal financing to external financing, it does not explain why 
firms issue equity. Myers (1984) argues that when firms have dividend ratio constraints or external debt 
constraints, they may issue equity. However, some research demonstrates that firms issue equity even 
when they are not financially constrained (see, for instance, Loughran and Ritter, 1997).   
       The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section presents a basic model description. 
Section 3 analyses the separating equilibria. Section 4 presents the model implications and compares the 
results with other theories. Section 5 suggests several extensions of the basic model and discusses the 
robustness of its results.  The conclusions are presented in Section 6.  
2. Basic model.  
 
Consider a firm with a two-stage investment project. In each period, indexed by 1 2t = , , an amount b  
has to be invested. In each period the project can either be successful or unsuccessful. There are two 
types of firms: for firm I  the probability of success in period t  equals Itθ  and for firm S  it is Stθ . The 
cash flow of type X I S= ,  in period  t  is denoted by Xtr . In the case of success 1Xtr = , otherwise 
0Xtr = . Total expected cash flow for type X  over both periods is then 1 2X X Xv θ θ= + . We assume the 
θ ’s are restricted to the interval ( ],1b , which implies that the investment has positive net present value 
in each period. Firm I  is "performance-improving" relative to firm S  ("stagnating") because  
    I Sg g≥                                                                      (1)                 
where Xg  denotes the rate of earnings growth ( 2 1X Xθ θ/ ). A firm X  has increasing expected cash flows 
                                                                                                                                                                        
about the firm’s quality (other asymmetric information models typically assume that there are “good” and “bad” types and 
that the hierarchy of types remains the same over time or across the projects). This paper focuses on the debt maturity 
choice. The absence of second-period investments, together with the assumption that a firms’ overall cash flows are ordered 
by first-order stochastic dominance, precludes any prediction about the issuance of equity in Goswami, Noe and Rebello 
(1995). In this case, both long term debt and equity represent claims on the firm’s total cash flow, and thus equity is 
eliminated by the standard pecking order argument (Nachman and Noe, 1994). 
6Recall that in the present paper the investment is two-staged and asymmetric information exist about earnings from both 
stages of investment. 
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if 1Xg > , and the cash flow profile is flat or declining if 1Xg =  or 1Xg <  respectively. The firm’s 
performance can be described by a pair ( Xv , Xg ) . The probabilities of success in each stage are then:  
                                                         1 1
X
X
X
v
gθ = +  and 2 1 X XX X
v g
gθ = +                                                                   (2) 
The extent of asymmetric information regarding long-term cash flows is greater than or equal to that of 
short-term cash flows: 
                                                                1 1 2 2I S I Sθ θ θ θ− ≤ −                                                                 (3) 
Short-term performance may be significantly related to the firm’s past activities which may be known 
to the public while long-term performance relies more heavily on new decisions.  
       The firm’s profit is observable and verifiable. There exists universal risk-neutrality and perfect 
competition among investors. This implies zero market profit and risk-neutral valuation for any security 
issued.  
2. 1. Financing strategies. In the first period the firm X I S= ,  may issue equity (denote this strategy 
by e), short-term (d) or long-term debt (l).7  
      Equity financing. In the first period the firm issues XnΔ  shares for the price p  such that the amount 
of financing covers the investment needs: Xp n bΔ =  where p  denotes the market price of shares. After 
observing the first-period cash flow 1Xr  the firm may distribute dividends 11X
r
XD  or may use funds 1X
r
Xf  
to finance the second stage internally: 1 11 1X X
r r
X X Xr D f= + .8 In the second period firms do not finance with 
equity.9 Hence, in the second period, the firm has the choice between internal financing and debt (the 
amount of second-period debt equals 1XrXb f− ). Denote the second-period debt face value by 12 XrF . The 
second-period cash flow 2Xr  is distributed, in total, to the claimholders.           
                                                 
7In Section 5, we consider a model extension with mixed financing as well as other extensions. 
8Theoretically the firm can also keep cash until the second period. However, this scenario never appears in equilibrium and 
thus it is excluded for simplicity. We consider the scenario with dividend covenants where the firm must keep some cash 
later.  
9This is based on Myers and Majluf’s (1984) result that in a one-stage investment setting equity is never issued under 
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     Short-term debt. The firm issues debt with face value 1F  which matures at 1t = . If 1 0Xr =  (default) 
then two situations are possible. If 2 1V F≥  (where 2V  is the firm’s going concern value expected by 
investors) then the firm will rollover the existing debt by issuing a new claim with a real value equal to 
1F  (Flannery (1986), Diamond (1991), Goswami et al. (1995)). If 2 1V F<  then the creditors can get 
control over the firm. If control passes to the creditors, the second-period value of the firm is 2 2
cV Vγ= , 
where [ ]0,1γ ∈ . γ  may have two interpretations. First, it may mean that there are bankruptcy or 
reorganization costs. An alternative interpretation is that the entrepreneur has a superior ability to run 
the firm and its replacement reduces the firm’s value. To avoid a social loss when 1γ <  the firm can 
continue operating under the control of the initial shareholders. This decision depends on the 
renegotiation between the entrepreneur and the creditors. The renegotiation is conducted in the 
following manner: the entrepreneur makes a "take-it-or-leave-it" offer to the creditors to exchange their 
existing claims for new claims with face value rF  which mature in 2t = .10 The creditors may accept or 
reject the offer. If the offer is rejected the creditors get the firm’s equity and the shareholders get 
nothing.  
       Long-term debt. Long-term debt has face value 2F  and matures in 2t = . It can be senior or junior. 
If it is senior then any new claim issued in the second period will be subordinated and vice versa. When 
long-term debt is junior, the firm is always able to raise funds for financing the second stage when 
internal funds are insufficient. However, if the firm’s expected cash flow in the second stage is low and 
debt is senior, the firm may be not able to raise funds to finance the second stage. This may create a 
debt overhang problem. Since this leads to inefficiency, the parties may renegotiate at the end of the 
first period. We continue to assume that shareholders make “take-or leave-it” offer to the creditors. 
       The firm’s type is revealed to the entrepreneur in period 0  while financing and investments take 
                                                                                                                                                                        
asymmetric information. 
10Under an alternative scenario the parties may divide the surplus from continuation in the proportion 50-50 (Nash solution) 
or in other proportions. This will not change the model results as long as the value of the firm under the creditors control is 
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place in periods 1 and 2 . The firm’s initial capital structure is 100%  equity, with n  shares outstanding. 
Let Xtα  denote the proportion of equity owned by the entrepreneur in period t  (immediately after the 
issue of securities in period t , if it takes place). Clearly, 0 1Xα = . The second-period financial outsiders 
observe the first-period capital structure choice and first-period cash flow. Throughout this article, we 
use the concept of Perfect-Bayesian equilibria.  
       For our purposes it will be suitable to present a set of exogenous parameters describing the model 
as ( , , , , , )I I S Sv g v g b γ . In the next section we will analyze the parameter values under which a 
separating equilibrium may exist. 
3. Separating equilibria. 
 
     Let ( , , , , , )j jKM K K M MV V v g v g b γ≡  be the expected payoff to the entrepreneur of type K  (with total 
value Kv  and rate of growth Kg ) if the strategy , { , , }j j e d l∈  is played and the type is perceived by the 
market as type M  (with the parameters Mv  and Mg ), , { , }K M I S∈ . A separating equilibrium is a 
situation where type I  plays strategy 1j , type S  plays strategy 2j  and no type has an incentive to 
mimic the other type: 
                                                               2 1j jIS IIV V≤  and 1 2j jSI SSV V≤                                                             (4) 
       It is thus clear that the analysis of the jKMV  function is crucial. The value of 
j
KMV  depends on the 
performance of type K  and the prices of issued securities. The latter are equal to the symmetric 
information prices for type M  which will be marked with subscript M , for instance the symmetric 
information share price for type M  is Mp   and the face value of short-term debt is 1MF . We have: 
                                                         1 1 2
1 21 1 2
[ ]K K K
K K
r r re
KM K r K r KV E D E Dα= +   
where 1 /K K M
n n
n n n b p
α = =+ Δ +  denotes the fraction of equity retained by the entrepreneur after 
                                                                                                                                                                        
related to the firm value under the shareholders control. Good references for the analysis of different defaults scenarios under 
asymmetric information are Berkovitch and Israel (1996) and Giammarino (1989). 
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issuing shares and 1 1 2
1 21 2
[ ]K K K
K K
r r r
r K r KE D E D+  denotes the expected dividends in periods 1 and 2.  
1
1
1
1 1(1 )KK
r
r K K KE D fθ= −  and 1 21 2 1 02 1 2 2 1 2 2(1 ) (1 ) (1 )K KK K r rr r K K K M K K ME D F Fθ θ θ θ= − + − − . Note that, given I  
performs better than S  in the second period, I  will always use internal financing in the second period 
if available in order to avoid the lemon problem. In contrast, S  pays out as much cash in dividends as 
possible and uses external financing. This is quite intuitive and thus formal proof is omitted for brevity. 
Finally, we have 
                                    1 1 01 1 2 2 1 2 2[ (1 (1 )) (1 ) (1 )]
e
KM K K K K M K K MV f F Fα θ θ θ θ= − + − + − −                                (5) 
      Let us turn to strategy d . Consider 1 0Kr = . If 2 1MV F≥  , where 2 2MV bθ= − , the firm will issue a 
new claim which matures in 2t =  with the face value equal to rMF  and with the real value equal to 1MF : 
1 2/
r
M M MF F θ= . This claim will be sold for 1MF  (recall that the creditors perceive the firm as type M ) 
and the proceeds from this issue will be used to pay off the existing debt. If 2 1M Mb Fθ − <   then the 
shareholders will offer the creditors a fraction γ  of the firm’s equity (it can be a new debt claim). This 
offer will be accepted because it provides the highest value (in case the firm is M  the value of equity 
offered to the creditors equals 2( )M bγ θ − ) the creditors can get through bankruptcy and getting control 
over the firm (according to their equilibrium beliefs about the firm’s type). If the fraction of equity 
offered to the creditors is less than γ  the creditors will reject the offer. In this case the shareholders get 
nothing and thus they have no interest to do so. To summarize, we get the following. If  2 1M Mb Fθ − <  
then    
                               1 1 01 1 2 2 1 2 2(1 (1 )) (1 )(1 ) (1 )
d
KM K M K K M K K MV F f F Fθ θ γ θ θ= − − + − + − − −                          (6) 
and otherwise  
                               1 1 01 1 2 2 1 2 2(1 (1 )) (1 ) (1 )
d r
KM K M K K M K K M MV F f F F Fθ θ θ θ= − − + − + − − −                           (7) 
where 1 2/
r
M M MF F θ= .  
        Similarly for strategy l  we get the following. If 02 21 M MF F≥ +  
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                             1 1 01 2 2 2 1 2 2 2(1 (1 )) (1 ) (1 )
l
KM K K K M M K K M MV f F F F Fθ θ θ θ= − + − − + − − −                           (8) 
The case 02 21 M MF F< +  never appears in equilibrium as shown in the Appendix (proof of Lemma 1).  
      The following lemma determines the prices of issued securities under symmetric information that 
that are necessary for the analysis of the jKMV  function. 
Lemma 1. If information is symmetric then for type ,X I S= :  
 1 2( 2 ) / ( 2 ) /X X X Xp b n v b nθ θ= + − = −      (9) 
                                                 { 1 2 1 21
2
( (1 )( )) / , 2
, 2
X X X X
X
X
b b b
F
b b
γ θ θ θ θ
θ
− − − <= ≥                                                       (10) 
                                                             1 12 2( ) /X X
r r
X X XF b f θ= −                                                                  (11) 
                                                                                  2/
r
X XF b θ=                                                                         (12) 
Financing with long-term debt is only possible if  2 2X bθ ≥  and  
                                                                    2 2/X XF b θ=         (13) 
(Proofs of all lemmas and propositions are collected in the Appendix)              
     As one can see from Lemma 1 the values of different securities depend in different ways on the 
firm’s expected performance in each period. Since each type performs differently in each period the 
value of securities issued by different types are different. To avoid mimicking, firms will issue 
securities which have a lower value compared to the other type. In this sense the following remarks 
about Lemma 1 are useful. Equation (9) implies that Xp  depends only on the firm’s total profit and not 
on its profit profile over time.  Total expected cash flow equals 1 2X Xθ θ+ . Total investment is 2b . Total 
expected earnings are thus 1 2 2X X bθ θ+ −  which implies (9).  
         If  2Xθ  is sufficiently high ( 2 2X bθ ≥ ) then short-term debt is risk-free because the firm can 
rollover this debt if 1 0Xr =  (a similar situation occurs in, for instance, Flannery (1986) and Goswami et 
al. (1995)). If 2 2X bθ <  then as follows from (10), the short-term debt face value is positively linked to 
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the amount of borrowing and negatively related to both the expected performance in the first- and 
second-periods and to the reorganization costs.  
         For long-term debt, if 2 2X bθ ≥  the value of debt depends only on the expected second-period 
performance. The firm cannot default in the first period (it does not matter whether the debt is senior or 
not) and all first-period earnings will be distributed to the shareholders. This is because internal 
financing in the second period increases the value of the creditors claim and reduces the shareholders 
value. Now when 2 2X bθ <  financing with long-term debt is impossible regardless of whether long-term 
is senior or not (although the explanations are different in both of these cases).11  
       From (11) the second-period debt face value is positively linked to the amount of external financing 
in the second period and negatively related to both expected second-period performance and retained 
earnings. 
      It follows from Lemma 1 and the definition of jKMV  that 1 2 2
j
KK K KV bθ θ= + −  for any { , , }j e d l∈ . 
The right side shows the expected payoff of type K  under symmetric information: it equals total 
expected cash flow minus the costs of investment which is not surprising in this Modigliani-Miller 
environment. This can be proven by substituting the prices of securities under symmetric information 
into the expressions for jKMV .                                                               
       Lemma 1 has several implications for the existence of separating equilibrium. For instance, if 
1 1I Sθ θ≥  or 2 2S Iθ θ≥  then one type has better performance than the other in both periods and thus by 
Lemma 1 any claim issued by this type has higher value.  
Lemma 2. If 1 1I Sθ θ≥  or 2 2S Iθ θ≥  a separating equilibrium does not exist.   
                                                 
11If debt is subordinated then the firm will also distribute all dividends to the shareholders and finance the second stage by 
borrowing. External investors will agree to provide second-period financing because their claim will be senior. When 
2 2X bθ <  the expected payoff to the long-term creditors is less than b . If long-term debt is senior and 2 2X bθ <  then  in the 
end of the first period the firm will face the debt overhang problem- it will not be able to raise funds for the second stage. To 
avoid a debt overhang problem the parties will renegotiate. The maximum payoff the long-term creditors can get in the 
second period equals the firm’s going concern value. Again when 2 2X bθ <  the firm’s going concern value ( 2 2X bθ − ) is less 
than b  which in turn implies that the expected payoff to the long-term creditors cannot cover the investment cost.  
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Corollary 1. If I Sg g=   a separating equilibrium does not exist.   
     It follows from Lemma 2 and Corollary 1 that if the firms’ rates of profit growth are equal or if one 
type has higher performance in both periods than the other, a separating equilibrium does not exist: the 
type with higher value will always be mimicked. We thus consider the case where the type with higher 
rate of earnings growth has lower performance in the first stage and higher performance in the second 
stage than the stagnating type:  
                                                                               1 1 2 2andI S S Iθ θ θ θ< <   (14) 
            I Sg g>  (15) 
                                                                             I Sv v≥                                                                        (16) 
The latter follows from (3) and (14).                             
        In such an environment, prices can be affected by the “lemon” effect in both periods. From (14) 
firms with high rate of earnings growth have low performance in the first period and high performance 
in the second period relative to “stagnating” firms. Intuitively, firms with a high rate of earnings growth 
appear to have an informational advantage in the first period: lower profits in this period mean that this 
type of firm can capitalize on the adverse selection problem. On the other hand, in the second period the 
informational advantage passes to firms with a low rate of earnings growth.  
        For our purposes the following definition will be useful. Let jKMR  be the expected surplus (the 
difference between the expected equilibrium payoff and the symmetric information payoff) to the 
entrepreneur of type K  if the strategy j  is played and the type is perceived by the market as the type 
M . 1 2 2
j j
KM KM K KR V bθ θ= − − + . Obviously 0jKKR =  which corresponds to the symmetric information 
case. From (4) a separating equilibrium exist if  
                                                                   2 0jISR ≤  and 1 0jSIR ≤                                                             (17)  
Lemma 3. / 0jKM MR v∂ ∂ >  for any { , , }j e d l∈ .  
       On the intuitive level Lemma 3 is straightforward: under asymmetric information a firm’s expected 
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surplus increases if the market value of the firm (the value of the firm from the investor’s viewpoint) 
increases. A more intriguing question is how changes in a firm’s earnings growth rate affect jKMR . This 
question is at the core of the analysis below.   
      From (2) an increase in the rate of earnings growth increases the firm’s expected performance in 
the second period. We know, from Lemma 1, that the price of equity depends on the value of the firm, 
and not just first-period performance. The value of any claim issued by the firm in the second period 
depends heavily on the firm’s second-period expected performance. Hence an increase in the market’s 
perception of the firm’s rate of earnings growth increases the expected payoff of the firm issuing equity.  
Lemma 4. / 0eKM MR g∂ ∂ > .  
Proposition 1.  A separating equilibrium where I  issues equity does not exist.  
       Proposition 1 is based on Lemmas 3 and 4, and on (15) and (16). An explanation for this result is as 
follows. Since the price of equity depends on the value of the firm, and not just first-period 
performance, I  cannot benefit from its informational advantage in the first period (when I  is a 
“lemon”). Moreover, I  will lose in the second period because of S ’s informational advantage in this 
period (when S  is a “lemon”). While when 1 1Ir =  I can use internal financing to mitigate the adverse 
selection problem linked to external financing in the second period, this problem is inevitable if 1 0Ir = . 
This logic also underlines the existence of a separating equilibrium, where I  uses debt financing and S  
uses equity financing.         
      Consider a separating equilibrium where S  plays equity and I  plays short-term debt. This 
equilibrium exists if and only if the following holds:  
                                                                                           0dSIR ≤                                                                                       (18) 
                                                                                          0eISR ≤                                                                                       (19) 
The first condition is the non-deviation condition for S . The second condition is the non-deviation 
condition for I .  Applying the above reasoning one can show that I  will not mimic S  when the latter 
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issues equity and (19) holds. Now consider (18). This only holds under some values of the parameters 
and does not hold otherwise. If the second-period expected performance of type I  is high enough to 
cover the cost of investment over both periods ( 2 2I bθ ≥ ) a separating equilibrium does not exist: S  
mimics I  because S  benefits from the low face value of debt in the second period while first-period 
debt is risk-free by Lemma 1 and it does not imply any value loss for S . We thus continue with the case 
2 2I bθ < . Generally speaking, for I  to separate from S , I  must issue claims with a value which 
depends heavily on first-period expected performance when I  is weak. Recall that the set of model 
parameters is ( , , , , , )I I S Sv g v g b γ . We will show that there exists a clear role for every parameter in 
balancing the weights of first-period and second-period expected performances in the value of debt.  
Lemma 5. / 0dSIR γ∂ ∂ > .  
     The intuition behind Lemma 5 is as follows. If γ  is low then first-period creditors will not 
significantly rely on the firm’s second period performance. Low γ  implies high reorganization costs or 
that it is costly to transfer ownership from the shareholders to creditors if the firm defaults in the first 
period. Thus the firm’s first-period expected performance becomes crucial in valuing debt. Since I  has 
low first-period expected performance, mimicking I  is not profitable for S  and vice versa. Lemma 5 
leads to the following proposition. 
Corollary 2. Either 0dSIR >  for any γ  or there exists * [0,1]γ ∈  such that 0dSIR ≤  if and only if 
*γ γ≤ (other parameters being equal) .12       
Proposition 2.  A separating equilibrium where I  issues short-term debt and S  issues equity exists if 
and only if *γ  exists (Corollary  2) and *γ γ≤ .        
      Now consider how changes in v ’s and g ’s affect the existence of equilibrium. Two ideas underline 
                                                 
12Long mathematical expressions showing the cutoff value *γ are omitted for brevity. Also note that the corner solution 
condition when 0dSIR >  for any value of γ  is given by substituting 0γ =  in (18) which is: 1 1 2 2/ / 2S I S Iθ θ θ θ+ ≤ . Its 
analysis is also omitted for brevity as well as some corner conditions for following propositions because they do not add a lot 
of new intuitions besides those described in the text. 
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the analysis below. First when the difference between firms’ total values is large enough a separating 
equilibrium does not exist because the type with a low total value will mimic the high value type. On 
the other hand, a large difference in the firms’ rates of earnings growth contributes to the existence of 
equilibrium by making it possible for I  to design debt claims which will not be mimicked by S .  
Lemma 6. 1) Either 0dSIR >  for any Sg  (other parameters being equal) or there exists *Sg  such that 
0dSIR ≤  if and only if *S Sg g≤ ; 2) / 0dSI SR v∂ ∂ <  and either 0dSIR >  for any Sv  (other parameters being 
equal)  or there exists *Sv  such that 0
d
SIR ≤  if and only if *S Sv v≥ .       
Proposition 3.  A separating equilibrium where I  issues short-term debt and S  issues equity exists if 
and only if the following holds: 1) *Sg  exists (Lemma 6) and 
*
S Sg g≤ ;  2) *Sv  exists (Lemma 6) and 
*
S Sv v≥ .       
      Proposition 3 follows directly from Lemma 6 and our previous discussion of this equilibrium 
(equations (18) and (19)). Similarly we have the following results. A separating equilibrium where I  
issues short-term debt and S  issues equity exists if Ig  is sufficiently high (other parameters being 
equal) and Iv  is sufficiently low (close to Sv ).  
                                                             [Insert Figure 1 here]  
      Figure 1 illustrates Proposition 3. Here 1 21.5, 1.6, 0.64, 0.96, 0.6I I I Ig v bθ θ= = = = =  and 0.4γ = . 
The figure shows under which values of Sg  and Sv  separating equilibriums may exist. In the space 
below the thick line ( A ) the separating equilibrium, where I  plays debt and S  plays equity, exists. In 
B  the separating equilibrium does not exist. Note that for any value of Sv  a separating equilibrium 
exists if Sg  is low enough and for any Sg  a separating equilibrium exists if Sv  is high enough. In other 
words a separating equilibrium exists if asymmetric information about rate of earnings growth is more 
important than that concerning the firms’ total values. Also note that a separating equilibrium does not 
exist when 1.5S Ig g= =  for any value of Sv  as was discussed in Section 3.1.  
 16
     Finally we have the following result.   
Proposition 4.  A separating equilibrium where I  issues long-term debt does not exist.  
      By Lemma 1, the value of long-term debt corresponding to type I  is lower than that of type S  and 
therefore if this type issues long-term debt it will be mimicked by S . 
4. Implications. 
 
      The analysis of this paper implies that when private information is two-dimensional and contains 
information about firm value and the cash flow profile over time, the choice between debt and equity 
may be used as a signaling device. A separating equilibrium may exist where type I  issues debt and 
type S  issues equity. This equilibrium has the following predictions:  
(i) Firms issuing equity have lower operating performance in the long run as compared to non-issuing 
firms ( 2 2S Iθ θ< ). This conclusion is confirmed by empirical findings for IPO firms (see, among others, 
Jain and Kini (1994), Pagano, Panetta and Zingales (1998), Cai and Wei (1997), Mikkelson et al. (1997) 
and Purnanandam and Swaminathian (2004)) and for SEO (seasoned equity issues) firms (Loughran 
and Ritter, 1997).13 (ii) These firms have a lower ratio of long-term earnings to short-term earnings as 
compared to non-issuing firms ( S Ig g< ). (iii) The absolute performance of firms issuing equity 
exceeds the performance of non-issuing firms at the time of issue or in the near future after issue 
( 1 1S Iθ θ> ).14      
      Existing literature suggests few explanations for the long-term underperformance of firms issuing 
equity. Among basic rational market intuitions, the following theories are notable. The theory of agency 
cost of equity (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) underlines the idea that equity issues decrease the 
manager’s stake in the company and reduce the incentive to undertake value maximizing projects. This 
results in afterissuing underperformance of the firm, though the theory does not compare the 
performance in the short run with that in the long run after the issue. Also note that the link between 
                                                 
13Note that in the context of our model, the non-equity-issuing firms are actually the ones who issue debt. As Eckbo, Masulis 
and Norli (2000) mention, and Eckbo and Norli (2001) empirically confirm, issuing firms have lower leverage relative to 
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afterissuing underperformance and a low managerial fraction of equity is empirically controversial. For 
instance, Pagano et al. (1995), Cai and Loughran (1998) and Mickelson et al. (1997) do not confirm the 
positive correlation between the fraction of insiders’ equity and firm performance.  
      The trade-off theory in its standard form, proposing that firms equalize the marginal tax benefits 
associated with additional debt to the marginal cost of bankruptcy, suggests that more profitable firms 
should issue more debt. However, it will not predict the link between debt-equity choice and dynamic 
profile of performance after the issue (long-term performance versus short-term performance). For 
instance, it will predict that type S  (high expected performance in the first period) should issue more 
debt than I  in the first period in contrast to our results. According to the free cash flow theory (Jensen, 
1986) debt is an instrument for solving the problem of a manager’s entrenchment and thus more debt 
should lead to higher overall performance.  However, this theory does not give an explanation for why 
firms should issue equity. This theory would also suggest that type S  (with high expected performance 
in the first period) should issue debt in order to prevent managers from overspending. Recently several 
dynamic versions of the trade-off model were developed which combine taxes, bankruptcy costs and 
different kinds of agency costs. Typically, these models lead to less extreme and more realistic 
predictions than the basic ideas do. However, we have not found a model which systematically analyzes 
the link between debt-equity choice and dynamic profile of operating performance after the issue. We 
will provide more discussion of dynamic trade-off models later when we discuss the correlation 
between debt and profitability.  
      The market timing argument (see, for instance, Baker and Wurgler, 2002) points out that while in 
Modigliani and Miller environment the capital structure decisions are not affected by the magnitude of 
share prices or by the “hotness” of the market, in reality one observes that firms tend to issue equity 
when the market prices are relatively high and do not issue equity when the prices are relatively low.  
To relate this observation to the evidence about operating performances, one line of the literature 
                                                                                                                                                                        
non-issuing firms. This is consistent with the idea that, unlike issuing firms, non-issuing firms prefer debt financing.   
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focuses on non-rational aspects of investors behavior. For instance, some research argues that investors 
tend to be overoptimistic during new issues or that the analysts’ forecasts are inadequately high.15 The 
firms thus sell shares when they are overvalued or the firm is expected to perform poorly compared to 
the price of the issue. Theo, Welch and Wong (1998) argue that managers manipulate earnings 
(sacrifice future earnings by pushing up current earnings) prior to going public in order to attract more 
non-informed investors. We share with this paper the idea that managers may be involved in earnings 
management leading to their private information about the timing of cash flows. However our 
framework assumes completely rational investors which infer information about a firm’s earnings 
profile from observing its financing decision.16 The difference between these two approaches (rational 
market versus non-rational) is not only theoretical. Some recent empirical research argues in favor of  
efficient market version of the market timing argument (Schultz (2003) and Butler, Grullon and Weston 
(2005)) -“pseudo-market timing”- where shares are not overpriced.  
      When investors are rational the prices are supposed to correctly reflect firms’ current and future 
earnings and not only current earnings. In such an environment and assuming that there is no 
asymmetric information or agency costs, how can one explain that first, firms time their issues and 
second, why the firms issue shares when operating performance is high and why it becomes low in the 
long run after issue? The literature based on rational investors is able to argue why firms may be 
interested in issuing equity in periods when market prices are high although it is not focused on 
explaining the link between debt-equity choice and changes in operating performance after issue (long-
term versus short-term).17   
                                                                                                                                                                        
14The empirical evidence on this point was discussed in the introduction. 
15For references see Ritter and Welch (2002) or Loughran and Ritter (1997). 
16Stein’s (1989) model explains earnings inflation in a rational world but it does not explicitly analyzes a debt-equity choice 
problem. 
17In Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) firms can time their projects and the financial market is imperfect (there are switching 
rents imposed by intermediaries). Low-profit projects tend to be financed with equity and high-profit projects with debt. 
Firms will develop only the projects with sufficiently high quality. In recession, only highly profitable projects will be 
undertaken (with debt financing) and low-profit projects will be shelved until an expansion occurs. This paper offers an 
explanation for why more equity is issued during expansions. In Lucas and  McDonald  (1990) firms are allowed to issue 
only equity. This paper explains why equity issues on average are preceded by abnormally positive stock returns and why 
equity issues are positively correlated with stock market performance. 
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      Below we show that the separating equilibrium described in this paper is consistent with market 
timing (or rather “pseudo-market timing”) empirical evidence. In period 0 before the information about 
the firm type is acquired by managers and before the financing decision is made the market share price 
equals 0 ( 2 ) / (1 )( 2 ) /I Sp v b n v b nμ μ= − + − − , where μ  denotes the proportion of firms of type I .  
After the managers of type S  get information about earnings they will realize that the true value of type 
S  shares is ( 2 ) /Sv b n− . Since the market price will still remain the same because the investors do not 
know the firm’s type the managers of type S  will see their shares to be overvalued if 0μ > : 
0 ( 2 ) /Sp v b n> −  which follows from (16). They then issue equity. Investors will infer correctly that 
equity is issued by type S . The price fall during the issue of shares reflects the well-known 
underpricing of newly issued shares phenomenon. Also the second-period share price of type S  ( 2Sp ) 
is lower than its first-period price. 
Proposition 5.  In a separating equilibrium where I  issues debt and S  issues equity 0 2S Sp p p> > .  
Note that the investors remain completely rational in our model and have zero-profit in equilibrium.  
       Both the agency and trade-off theory also provide insight into market timing. According to the debt 
overhang problem (Myers, 1977) an excessive senior debt may lead the firm to forego some valuable 
investment opportunities. Thus, a firm with high market value of shares and good investment 
opportunities respectively will lose more from underinvestment and will thus issue equity instead. 
However it is not straightforward to predict a link between equity issues and subsequent operating 
performance consistent with observable evidence without making additional assumptions about, for 
instance, the link between share price and current operating performance.18 An advantage of the present 
paper compared to Myers (1977) (and some other theories mentioned in this section) is that it is not 
based on the link between profitability and investment opportunities (for instance Jain and Kini (1994) 
and Loughran and Ritter (1997) do not find that afterissuing underperformance is due to the lower or 
                                                 
18If one assumes that high current performance corresponds to the high share price then it can explain point (ii). It will still 
be difficult to explain why a firm issuing equity should underperform in the long run after issuing equity and undertaking all 
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higher amounts of investment). In our model, all firms invest the same amount of funds and the 
difference comes only from future operating performance profiles. Finally note that Baker and Wrugler 
(2002) do not find a lot of support for underinvestment theory of market timing.  
       (iv) The model predicts that leverage is negatively correlated with profitability.19 To see this let us 
look at the dynamics of capital structure (in market values) of both types of firms over two periods. 
Consider the basic model and a separating equilibria where I  issues short-term debt and S  issues 
equity. In period 1 (after the securities are issued until the earnings are received) the debt/equity ratio of 
type S  is 0 and that of type I  is /( 2 )Ib v b−  (the denominator shows the market value of firm’s equity). 
It is clear that the debt/equity ratio of type I  is higher than that of type S  while the opposite is true for 
average earnings in the first period. This conclusion does not change if one measures debt/equity ratios 
at the end of first period (after the earnings are received but before second-period financing decision is 
made). In the second period (after the second-period financing decision is made and before the second-
period earnings are received) the debt/equity ratio of type S  is 2/( )Sb bθ −  and that of type I  is 
2/( )Ib bθ − .  We see that the debt/equity ratio of type S  is higher because 2 2S Iθ θ<  which confirms the 
negative correlation between debt and profitability in the second period as well. 
      Note that the trade-off theory in its standard form is inconsistent with the negative correlation 
between debt and profitability because highly-profitable firms should tend to finance with debt in order 
to reduce their taxes. Hennessy and Whited (2005) develop a dynamic trade-off theory with the idea 
that a profitable firm does not have to distribute its earnings immediately as the standard models 
assume. This may reduce the incentive to reduce taxes by issuing debt. The financing decision depends 
on the next period financing margin or what the firm is going to do in the future: to issue more equity, 
to distribute more earnings or to remain neutral. While providing a valid intuition about why the static 
trade-off may not work, the authors do not obtain a theoretical proposition about the link between debt 
                                                                                                                                                                        
its investment opportunities.  
19See, for instance, Titman and Wessels (1988) and Rajan and Zingales (1995). 
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and profitability. However, they do show numerically that under some plausible values of parameters 
one can observe the negative correlation between debt and profitability in their model. 
      Zwiebel (1996) develops a dynamic model of capital structure based on the managers’ entrenchment 
argument. The paper suggests that when a firm has more valuable investment opportunities the need to 
issue new debt as a disciplinary device decreases which leads to the situation where firms with lower 
debt are likely to be more profitable. While providing an idea about the negative correlation between 
debt and profitability the paper does not explain why firms issuing equity underperform in the long run. 
Also equity financing is not explicitly analyzed in the model.  
      Several empirical predictions which have not been tested in the literature follow from Propositions 2 
and 3. (v) Long-term operating underperformance of firms issuing equity should more frequently be 
observed when reorganization costs increase (Proposition 2); (vi) this phenomenon should more 
frequently be observed when asymmetric information regarding the timing of cash flows is larger than 
that regarding the total cash flows (Proposition 3). Possible tests of these predictions will be based on 
identifying firms and industries with high and low reorganization costs (bankruptcy cost). For industries 
with high reorganization costs the underperformance of firms issuing equity should be a more frequent 
phenomenon. One can also use the spread in analysts’ valuations of firms’ shares as a proxy for the 
extent of asymmetric information regarding the firms’ total values and the spread in the forecasts of 
future earnings (long-term spread versus short-term spread) as a proxy for asymmetric information 
about future rates of earnings growth. Also firms manipulating earnings prior to issue (as in Theo and 
all, 1998) can be seen as ones with high degree of asymmetric information about timing of earnings 
since earnings management can often be seen as a redistribution of earnings between periods rather than 
accounting fraud (Degeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser, 1999).  
       Finally the model sheds some new light on possible motives for firms to use such financial 
instruments as dividend covenants, asset-backed securities and non-recourse debt which we discuss in 
the next section.  
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5. The model extensions and robustness. 
 
5.1. Long-term debt with dividend covenants. Long-term debt can be issued with dividend covenants. 
The latter can establish maximal amount (Y ) of dividends the firm is allowed to pay in the first period. 
Intuitively a low Y  makes payments to creditors depend more heavily on the first-period cash flow. 
This allows type I  to explore its informational advantage related to their low first-period performance. 
One can show that a separating equilibrium may exist where I  issues long-term debt with dividend 
covenants and S  issues equity. The existence of this equilibrium is negatively related to the extent of 
asymmetric information regarding the firms’ values and positively related to the extent of asymmetric 
information regarding the rates of earnings growth confirming the findings in basic model.  
5.2. Asset-backed securities (ABS). Suppose that the firm can issue ABS to finance the first stage of the 
project. The idea is that if the project fails then, in contrast to short-term debt, the creditors (or the 
holders of ABS) do not have any legal rights of recourse to the assets of the firm and thus the firm can 
continue with the second stage without getting into trouble with “old” investors.20 Therefore formally 
this debt is analogous to the case of short-term debt when 0γ = . According to Proposition 2, a 
separating equilibrium where I  issues ABS and S  issues equity may exist even if it does not when the 
firm can only issue short- or long-term debts (as long as 0γ > ). ABS are now used by many 
corporations as a financing method. The usual explanation in existing literature is that these securities 
exist primarily for regulatory reasons (for instance, banks were trying to avoid minimal capital 
requirements). However, recent empirical literature (Calomaris and Mason, 2004) argues that 
securitization seems to be motivated more by efficient contracting reasons. The present paper provides 
an insight based on two-dimensional asymmetric information about why the firm may issue this kind of 
securities. Similar logic can be applied to entrepreneurial debt, non-recourse debt, debtor-in-pocession 
claims or project financing (see, for instance, Finnerty, 1996).  Esty (2004) reports that total investment 
financed by non-recourse debt has grown from less than $10 billion per year in the late 1980s to more 
                                                 
20Typically the firm creates a special purpose vehicle-separate legal entity to work with the project. 
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than $100 billion per year in the beginning of the twenty-first century. Within the United States, firms 
financed $68 billion of their capital expenditures through project companies in 2001, approximately 
twice the amount raised in initial public offerings (IPOs) or invested by venture capital firms. The 
existing explanations for issuing non-recourse debt are based on agency or moral hazard problems. See, 
for example, Esty (2003).  
5.3. Mixed financing. In this subsection we allow the firm to issue any mix of different securities for 
financing. Allowing mixed financing provides little usefulness for the analysis of operating 
performance of firms issuing equity versus that of non-issuing firms. The reason is that most empirical 
literature on this topic does not differentiate issuers according to fractions of equity in capital structure. 
Even a marginally small issue of shares puts a firm into the category of issuing firms. Thus it will be 
hard to interpret the equilibrium in terms of existing empirical evidence. However, allowing for mixed 
financing is important with regard to the conclusions about the negative correlation between debt and 
profitability and more interestingly about the conditions of existence of this phenomena which 
constitute an addition to the literature on this phenomena.   
      Let  
       e db b b= +  
where eb  and db  denote equity and debt (for simplicity of exposition we assume that debt is short-
term).21 Hence the first-period financing policy can be described by, for instance, a variable eb , 
0 eb b≤ ≤ . Note that 0eb =  corresponds to pure short-term debt financing and eb b=  corresponds to 
pure equity financing. Denote the entrepreneur’s expected payoff if the type is K , strategy eb  is played 
and the type is perceived by the market as M  by ( )KM eV b .  
  The case 0db >  and 1 0Xr =  is analogous to pure short-term debt financing. If 2 1V F≥  the shareholders 
will offer the creditors a new claim with the real value equal 1F . This offer will be accepted because it 
                                                 
21This assumption is not crucial. 
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is the best claim the creditors can get if they appeal. If the value of new claim is less than 1F  the court 
will force an increase in the value of the new claim. If 2 1V F<   then the shareholders will offer the 
creditors a fraction γ  of the firm’s equity. This offer will be accepted because it is the best value the 
creditors can get through bankruptcy and getting the control over the firm.  
    With mixed financing, firms have a much greater degree of freedom than in the basic model and thus 
the set of possible equilibriums becomes much larger. More precisely each combination of initial 
parameters ( , , , , , )I I S Sv g v g bϕ γ=  can support several separating equilibrium, in most cases a 
continuum of equilibria. We will denote an equilibrium as , ( )σ σ ϕ∈Ξ  where ( )ϕΞ  denotes the set of 
all possible separating equilibriums when the exogenous parameters are given by ϕ . We will show 
however that in qualitative aspects the results are very similar to those found in the basic model. First of 
all, Lemma 7 (see Appendix) shows that the valuation of securities in this setting has a lot in common 
with pure financing scenarios. For instance, the share price depends only on the firm’s total value and 
not on the rate of earnings growth. Secondly, we show that an increase of debt in the capital structure of 
type I  reduces the potential earnings of S  if it mimics I  and conversely an increase of equity in the 
capital structure of S  reduces the potential payoff of I  if it mimics S .  
Lemma 8. ( ) / 0; ( ) / 0SI e e IS e eV b b V b b∂ ∂ > ∂ ∂ < .            
Lemma 8 leads to the following result.  
Proposition 6. For each set of exogenous parameters ϕ  there exist two subsets of separating 
equilibriums 1Ξ  and 2Ξ , 1 2Ξ Ξ =∅∩ , 1 2 ( )ϕΞ Ξ = Ξ∪   such that: 1) in any 1σ ∈Ξ  I  uses a higher 
fraction of debt financing than S ; 2) an equilibrium σ  where I  plays eb  and S  plays 'eb  belongs to 
2Ξ  if and only if 2'σ ∈Ξ  where 'σ  is a separating equilibrium where I  plays 'eb  and S  plays eb .     
      1Ξ  provides strong support for the results of the basic model about the negative correlation between 
debt and profitability. Firms issuing more equity (type S ) have lower leverage during the first period 
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and higher profitability in that period and vice versa in the second period. On the other hand, 2Ξ  is 
irrelevant in predicting the link between debt and profitability since on average among all equilibriums 
in this set, type I  has the same debt as type S . Thus, it is similar to a pooling equilibrium situation 
which is not able to generate any predictions of this kind.           
Proposition 7. 1Ξ  is non-empty if and only if the conditions of propositions 2 and 3 hold.  
       Proposition 7 shows that the negative correlation between debt and profitability is likely to exist 
when asymmetric information regarding the timing of earnings is large and that about the firms’ total 
values is small.  
        In addition we consider a model extension where to issue each new kind of securities costs 0c > . 
A firm that uses either pure debt or pure equity financing pays c , while a firm choosing mixed 
financing pays 2c  (see Flannery (1986) for a similar approach).  
Proposition 8. If a separating equilibrium where at least one type uses mixed financing exists then 
there also exists a Pareto-dominant equilibrium where I  chooses  pure debt financing and S  chooses 
pure equity financing.  
        Proposition 8 is based on Lemma 8. There is no need for a type to issue two different kinds of 
securities and incur double fixed cost when to avoid mimicking it is enough to issue only one security 
(debt for I  and equity for S ). Proposition 8 supports the results of basic model.    
5.4. Up-front financing. If the firm is allowed to use up-front financing, the main results are not 
affected. Suppose that in the first period the firm issues securities with a total value larger than b , then 
invests b  in the first stage and keeps the rest for the second stage. Consider strategy e . One can show 
that the share price still depends only on the firm’s total value. Thus the same logic applies. If I  uses 
up-front equity financing in equilibrium then the second period claims of type I  will be overpriced if 
type S  mimics type I  in equilibrium. Another problem with up-front financing is that keeping cash can 
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be costly for the firm (Jensen, 1986).22 
6. Conclusions 
 
This paper examines optimal financing in a dynamic setting (two-stage investment process) under 
asymmetric information. The analysis is based on the idea that firms have private information about 
their earnings profiles over time. The focus is on the analysis of separating equilibria and on the link 
between firms’ operating performance and financing strategies. It is shown that a separating equilibrium 
exists where firms with a higher rate of earnings growth issue less equity and more debt than firms with 
a stagnating profile. Thus the model predicts that: 1) firms issuing equity underperform in the long run; 
2) these firms have superior performance at the time of issue and; 3) there is a negative correlation 
between debt and profitability. According to Ritter and Welch (2002) long-term underperformance is 
one of the most intriguing phenomena in corporate finance, and of the many hypotheses offering an 
explanation, only a few are based on rational investor behavior. This paper has brought forth some new 
results which have not been tested in existing literature. Long-term operating underperformance of 
firms issuing equity should be more frequently observed when: 1) reorganization costs increase 
(Proposition 2) and; 2) asymmetric information regarding the timing of cash flows is larger than that 
regarding the total cash flows (Proposition 3). Some new light is also shed on the question why firms 
may be interested in issuing asset-backed securities or non-recourse claims based on asymmetric 
information.  
Appendix 
 
Proof of Lemma 1. Consider strategy e played by type , ,X X I S∈ . Denote the dividend per share in 
period 1 when the cash flow is 1Xr  by 11X
r
Xd  and the total dividend in period 1 by 11X
r
XD . Respectively 
1 2
2
X Xr r
Xd  and 1 22X X
r r
XD  denote the dividend per share (total dividend) paid in period 2  when first-period 
earnings are 1Xr  and second-period earnings are 2Xr . The following equations determine the prices of 
                                                 
22The only case when up-front equity may be important is one where the firms’ total values are exactly equal (Miglo and 
Zenkevich, 2006), keeping cash is not costly and the firm is prohibited from distributing first-period dividends. Then I  will 
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issued securities:  
1) budget constraint for equity issue:  
 X Xb p n= Δ   (20) 
2) market valuation of shares (share price equals the expected amount of dividends per share):  
 1 1 2
1 21 2
[ ]
X X
r r r
X r X r Xp E d E d= +      (21) 
3) total dividend in period t :  
                                                                         1 11 1( )
r r
X X XD d n n= + Δ                                                                                (22) 
                                                            1 2 1 22 2 ( )
r r r r
X X XD d n n= + Δ                                                                   (23) 
4) earnings distribution in period t :  
                                                                                1 11 1
r r
X X XD f r+ =                                                                                   (24) 
 1 2 12 2 2max{ 0}X X X
r r r
X X XD r F= − ,            (25) 
5) market valuation of second-period debt:  
 1 1
2 2 2
min{ }X X
X
r r
X r X Xb f E r F− = ,  (26) 
         Substituting (22)-(25) into (21) produces: 
1 1
1 21 2 2
[ max{ 0}]X X
X X
r r
r X X r X X
X
X
E r f E r F
p
n n
− + − ,= + Δ . Further 
using the identity 1 12 2 2 2 2max{ 0} min{ }X X
r r
X X X X Xr F r F r− , + , =  and (26) we get: 
1 1
1 21 2 1 2
[ [ ( )]]X X
X X
r r
r X X r X X X X
X
X X
E r f E r b f bp
n n n n
θ θ− + − − + −= =+ Δ + Δ . This equation together with (20) produces:  
                                                            1 2( 2 ) /X X Xp b nθ θ= + −                                                              (27)            
Also from (25):  
                                                                          1 12 2( ) /X X
r r
X X XF b f θ= −                                                                            (28) 
Now consider strategy d. If 1 0Xr =  then 2 2X XV bθ= −  and 2 2( )cX XV bγ θ= − . First consider the case 
                                                                                                                                                                        
not be mimicked by S  if it plays up-front equity. This scenario is unrealistic. 
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                                                                  1 2X XF bθ> −                                                                         (29) 
We have:  
6) market valuation of first-period debt:  
 2
1 2
0
1 1 1 1 2[min{ } Pr( ) ]XX X
r
r X X X X r Xb E r F r F E Dγ= , + <      (30) 
Equation (30) takes into account that if first-period cash flow is not sufficient to pay short-term debt the 
creditors get the fraction γ  of the firm’s equity.  
7) market valuation of second-period debt:  
 1 1
2 2 2
min{ }X X
X
r r
X r X Xb f E r F− = ,  (31) 
Equation (30) can be written as  
 
2
0
1 1 1 2 2(1 ) max{ 0}XX X X r X Xb F E r Fθ θ γ= + − − ,  (32) 
Using (31), 0 0Xf = and the identity:  
 1 12 2 2 2 2max{ 0} min{ }X X
r r
X X X X Xr F r F r− , + , =  
we get: 
 
2
0
2 2 2max{ 0}Xr X X XE r F bθ− , = −  (33) 
(32) and (33) imply  
 1 21
1
(1 )( )X X
X
X
b bF γ θ θθ
− − −=  (34) 
(34) implies that if 2 2X bθ < , condition (29) holds. If 2 2X bθ ≥  then 1XF b=  (debt is risk-free). If  
1 0Xr =  then debt can be rolled over by issuing a new claim with a face value 2/rX XF b θ= . Since  
2 2X bθ ≥  the firm will be able to finance the second stage by issuing a new claim with a face value 
0
2 2/X XF b θ= . 
     Strategy l. There is no default in 1t = . If long-term debt is junior then the firm distributes as much 
cash in dividend as possible in 1t =  and borrows b  in the second period. Then we have:  
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8) value of long-term debt:  
                                                                            
2 2 2
ˆmin{ }
Xr X
b E r F= ,                                                                             (35) 
where 2ˆr  denotes the funds remaining after the payment to second-period debtholders: 
1
2 2 2ˆ max{ 0}X
r
X Xr r F= − , . Also:  
9) market valuation of second-period debt:  
                                                                            1
2 2 2
min{ }X
X
r
r X Xb E r F= ,                                                                       (36) 
Which implies: 12 2/X
r
X XF b θ= . (35) can be rewritten as 2 2(1 / )X Xb bθ θ= −  if 2 21 / X Xb Fθ− ≤  and 
2 2X Xb Fθ=  if 2 21 / X Xb Fθ− > . The latter implies 2 2/X XF b θ=  and 2 2X bθ >  and the former gives 
2 2X bθ =  and 2 1/ 2XF ≥ . In the latter case  2XF  does not matter as long as 2 1/ 2XF ≥  (long-term 
creditors capture all residual earnings after the payment to the second-period creditors) and thus we can 
assume 2 21/ 2 /X XF b θ= = . Finally, strategy l is only possible if 2 2X bθ ≥  and 2 2/X XF b θ= .  
        If long-term debt is senior and 2 2X bθ ≥  then we have 02 21 X XF F≥ +  where 2 2/X XF b θ=  and 
0
2 2/X XF b θ= . The debtholders’ payoff does not depend on first-period earnings (which will be 
distributed in total to the shareholders) but only on second-period earnings. If 2 1Xr =  they are paid in 
full, otherwise they get nothing. If 2 2X bθ <  then if 1 0Xr =  the firm is not able to finance the second 
stage externally and thus the entrepreneur offers the creditors a claim with a real value equal to 0 . The 
creditors will accept the offer because if they do not, they will not have a legal right to appeal in 
contrast to the short-term debt scenario, and the firm will not finance the second stage. Finally if 
2 2X bθ <  financing with long-term debt is impossible.  
Proof of Lemma 2. Obviously 1 1I Sθ θ≥  implies 2 2I Sθ θ>  by (1). By Lemma 1, any claim issued by I  
has a higher value than that of type ,S  meaning that S  will always mimic I  (if they play a different 
strategy) and a separating equilibrium does not exist. Now 2 2S Iθ θ≥  implies 1 1S Iθ θ>  and we have the 
same situation as above, except that now the roles are reversed: I  mimics S . End proof.  
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Proof of Corollary 1. If 1 1I Sθ θ≥  then by Lemma 2 a separating equilibrium does not exist. Consider 
1 1I Sθ θ< . Then, by the definition of g and from I Sg g=  we have 2 2I Sθ θ< . By Lemma 2, a separating 
equilibrium does not exist. End proof.  
Proof of Lemma 3. Using (2), (5), Lemma 1 and the following identity:  
1 2
1 2
e e e
KM KM M KM M
M M M M M
R R R
v v v
θ θ
θ θ
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂= +∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂  
we get:                                                    
        
1
1 1 0 1 2 1
1 2 2 1 2 22 2
2
( )[ (1 (1 )) (1 ) (1 )] 0
( ) (1 )
e
KM M K M K K
K K K M K K M
M M M M
R g b fb f F F
v v b g
α θ θθ θ θ θ θ
∂ −= − + − + − − + >∂ − +  
(the first term is strictly positive and the second term is non-negative because 1 11K K Kf f bθ ≤ ≤ ). The 
proof is analogous for the rest of the Lemma (all parts of proofs, omitted for brevity, are available upon 
demand). End proof.  
Proof of Lemma 4. Using (2), (5), Lemma 1 and the following identity:  
                                                                 1 2
1 2
e e e
KM KM M KM M
M M M M M
R R R
g g g
θ θ
θ θ
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂= +∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂  
we get:                                               
1
1 1
2 2
2
( ) 0
(1 )
e
KM M M K K
M M M
R v b f
g g
α θ
θ
∂ −= >∂ +  
This is strictly positive because 1 11K K Kf f bθ ≤ ≤  and if K I=  then by (14) 1 1 1 1K I Sθ θ θ= < ≤  and if 
K S=  then 1 1 0K Sf f= = . End proof.  
Proof of Proposition 1. Suppose that a separating equilibrium exists where I  plays equity. Then the 
following should hold: 
                                                                                       0eSIR ≤                                                                                          (36)                
Also:                                                                              
                                  ( , , , , , ) ( , , , , , ) 0e e e eSI S S I I S S S S SSR R v g v g b R v g v g b Rγ γ≡ > ≡ =                              (37) 
 31
This inequality follows from Lemmas 3 and 4, the continuity of (.)eR , (15) and (16). From (37) the 
condition (36) cannot be true. End proof.  
Proof of Lemma 5. Since 2 2I bθ <  we have from (6) and (7):   
                                           2 1 1 2 1 2 1
1 2
( )( (1 ) (1 ))dSI I S I I I S S
I I
R bθ θ θ θ θ θ θ
γ θ θ
∂ − − − −=∂  
This is positive by (14). End proof.  
Proof of Corollary 2. Lemma 5 implies that three situations are possible.  
1. There exists [0,1]γ ∈   such that *( ) 0dSIR γ = . Then let *γ γ= . Corollary 2 follows from Lemma 5. 
2. 0dSIR <  for any [0,1]γ ∈ . Then let * 1γ = .  
3. 0dSIR >  for any [0,1]γ ∈ . End proof. 
Proof of Proposition 2.  First note that (19) holds by Lemmas 3 and 4.  We have      
                                    ( , , , , , ) ( , , , , , ) 0e e e eIS I I S S I I I I IIR R v g v g b R v g v g b Rγ γ≡ < ≡ =  
 This inequality follows from Lemma 3 and 4, the continuity of (.)eR , (15) and (16). Secondly consider 
(18). By Corollary 2 it holds if and only if *γ  exists and *γ γ≤ . End proof. 
Proof of Lemma 6. Part 1. From (6) and (7) we have: 3
( )
(1 )
d
SI S S
S S
R v A Bg
g g
∂ +=∂ +  where 
                                   2 1 2 1 1 2
1 2
( ) ( )((1 ) (1 ) )I I I S I I I
I I
b b vA θ θ γ θ θ θ θθ θ
− − − − + −=                                           (38) 
                                                          2
2
( )(1 ) 0I S
I
b vB γ θ θ
− += − <                                                            (39) 
( A  and B  are both independent of Sg ). From (1) and the definition of  Sg  we have: [ , ]S Ig b g∈ . Three 
situations are possible. 
1. / Ib A B g≤ − ≤ . Then 0
d
SI
S
R
g
∂ ≥∂  if / SA B g− >  and 0
d
SI
S
R
g
∂ ≤∂  if / SA B g− < . Also 0
d
SIR >  when 
S Ig g=  by Lemma 2 and (16). Then either 0dSIR >  for any Sg  or there exists * [ , ]S Ig b g∈  such that 
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0dSIR >  if and only if *S Sg g< . 
2. /b A B> − . Then 0
d
SI
S
R
g
∂ <∂  for any Sg  which implies (because 0
d
SIR >  when S Ig g= ) that 0dSIR >  
for any Sg .  
3. / IA B g− > . Then 0
d
SI
S
R
g
∂ >∂  for any Sg . Again either 0
d
SIR ≥  for any Sg  or there exists * [ , ]S Ig b g∈  
such that 0dSIR >  if and only if *S Sg g< . 
Part 2. From (6) we have: 
2 2 1 2 2 2 1 2 1
1 2
( ( ) ) ( )( ) ( ( )( 1) ) 0
(1 )
d
SI I I I I S I S I I S
S I I S
R b b b g b b
v g
θ γ θ γθ θ θ θ θ γ θ θ
θ θ
∂ − − + − − + − − −= <∂ +  
(the second term is obviously strictly negative and the first term is strictly negative because 2 2I bθ < , 
1γ ≤  and 2 2S Iθ θ< ). The rest of lemma follows from this inequality. End proof. 
Proof of Proposition 3. From our previous proofs (19) holds. From the first part of Lemma 6, (18) holds 
if and only if *S Sg g≤  (other parameters being equal). The second part of proposition 3 follows from the 
second part of Lemma 6. End proof.  
Proof of Proposition 4. Suppose that a separating equilibrium exists where I  plays long-term debt. 
From (14) and Lemma 1 the claims issued by type I  have higher value than the symmetric information 
value of claims issued by type S . Thus S  will mimic I . End proof. 
Proof of Proposition 5. The first part was proven in the main text. Consider the second part. First-
period share price of type S  is 1 2( 2 ) /S S Sp b nθ θ= + − . The second-period share price is 
2 2( ) /( )S Sp b n nθ= − ++  where  2 2/ /( 2 )S S Sn b p bn bθ θ= = + −+  by Lemma 1. Therefore    
             2 1 2 2 1 2 1 1 2( 2 ) / ( ) /( ) ( 2 ) / ( ) 0S S S S S S S S S Sp p b n b n n b n bθ θ θ θ θ θ θ θ− = + − − − + = + − + − >+ .  
Proof of Proposition 6.  
Lemma 7. If information is symmetric then: 
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 1 2( 2 ) / ( 2 ) /X X X Xp b n r b nθ θ= + − = −   
                                          { 1 2 1 21
2
( (1 )( )) / ,
,
d X X X X d
X
d X d
b b b b
F
b b b
γ θ θ θ θ
θ
− − − < += ≥ +                   
                                                               1 12 2( ) /X
r r
X X XF b f θ= −                                                                  
                                                                          2 2( ) /
r
X X XF bγ θ θ= −                                                                                        
Proof of Lemma 7 is omitted for brevity (similar to that of Lemma 1).                                                                   
Proof of Lemma 8. If the firm is perceived by the market as type I  then the prices of securities are 
equal to the symmetric information prices for type I . If 0db >  and 2d Ib bθ> −  then 
           1 1 1 2 2 1 2 2( ) [ (1 (1 / )) (1 )(1 ) (1 / )]SI e I S I S I S S IV b F b bα θ θ θ θ γ θ θ= − + − + − − −                              
where  
 1 21
1 2
2
2
I I
I
I I e
b
b b
θ θα θ θ
+ −= + − +  
 1 21
1
(1 )( )d I I
I
I
b bF γ θ θθ
− − −=    
Thus  2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 1
1 2
( ) ( )( ( (1 ) (1 ))SI e I S I I S S I I I S S
e I I
V b b
b
θ θ θ θ θ γ θ θ θ θ θ θ
θ θ
∂ − − − − − −=∂  
By (14), this expression attains its minimum when 1γ =  and it is 2 1 2 2
2
( ) ( ) 0I S I S
I
bθ θ θ θ
θ
− − > . The proof 
is analogous for the second part.  End proof.  
Lemma 9. If an equilibrium exists where I plays eb  and  S  plays 
'
eb  and 
'
e eb b>  then there is also an 
equilibrium where I plays 'eb  and  S  plays eb  .                                                                            
Proof. Suppose that a separating equilibrium where I  plays eb  and S  plays 
'
eb  exists and that 
'
e eb b>  . 
If 0d eb b b= − >  and 2I db bθ − ≥  then by Lemma 7 all claims issued by type I  have a higher value 
than those of type S  and thus a separating equilibrium is impossible. If 0db =  then a separating 
equilibrium does not exist (analogous to Proposition 4). We thus consider the case 0db >  and 
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2I db bθ − < . Since no type has an incentive to mimic another type we have:  
 ' 1 2( ) 2IS e I IV b bθ θ≤ + −       (40) 
                                                                        1 2( ) 2SI e S SV b bθ θ≤ + −                                                                            (41) 
By Lemma 8 
 '( ) ( )SI e SI eV b V b≤  (42) 
From (41) and (42) we have:  
                                                                        ' 1 2( ) 2SI e S SV b bθ θ≤ + −                                                                            (43) 
Analogously we get    
                                                             1 2( ) 2IS e I IV b bθ θ≤ + −                                                               (44) 
(43) and (44) prove the existence of equilibrium where I  plays 'eb  and S  plays eb . End proof.  
Now we turn to the proof of Proposition 6.  Let 1Ξ  contain all equilibriums such as: 1) if I  plays eb  and 
S  plays 'eb   then 
'
e eb b< ; 2) an equilibrium where I  plays 'eb  and  S   plays eb  does not exist. Let 2Ξ  
contain all other separating equilibriums. 1Ξ  obviously satisfies the conditions described in the 
proposition. Now consider an equilibrium from 2Ξ  where I plays eb  and S plays 'eb . If 'e eb b<  then 
from above there is also an equilibrium in 2Ξ  where I plays 'eb  and S plays eb  which proves the 
proposition. The same is also true if 'e eb b>   by Lemma 9. End proof.  
Proof of Proposition 7. Sufficiency. It obviously follows from propositions 2 and 3: an equilibrium 
where I  issues only debt and S  issues only equity exists and it belongs to 1Ξ . Necessity. Suppose that 
the conditions of propositions 2 and 3 do not hold and 1Ξ  is non-empty. Thus a separating equilibrium 
exists. Then by Lemma 8 there also exists a separating equilibrium where I  issues only debt and S  
issues only equity which contradicts the assumption that the conditions of propositions 2 and 3 do not 
hold. End proof.  
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Proof of Proposition 8. Suppose that a separating equilibrium where I  plays eb  and S  plays 
'
eb  exists 
and at least one type plays mixed financing which costs 2c . Then by Lemma 8 there also exists an 
equilibrium where I  plays pure short-term debt and S  plays pure equity. This equilibrium is Pareto 
superior since the cost of issue is c  for both types. End proof.  
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Figure 1. Separating equilibria with short-term debt and equity.  
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